A social welfare function entitled 'ordinal Nash' is proposed. It is based on risk preferences and assumes a common, worst social state (origin) for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterization of the function is a weak version of independence of irrelevant alternatives. This axiom considers relative risk positions with respect to the origin. Thus, the resulting social preference takes into account non-expected utility risk preference intensity by directly comparing certainty equivalent probabilities. The function provides an interpretation of the Nash-utility-product preference aggregation rule. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the function to produce complete and transitive binary relations are characterized.
Introduction
In his classic work, Arrow (1951) introduced the concept of a social welfare function. Arrow's axiomatic analysis led to the well known impossibility result, according to which no social welfare function exists that satisfies the axioms of universal domain, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and non-dictatorship. Arrow's path breaking conclusion was extensively analyzed thereafter, resulting in a variety of modified impossibility and possibility theorems.
An interesting question concerns the axiomatization of the Nash social welfare function -the preference aggregation rule which assumes the existence of a common worst social state (or origin) for all individuals in society, and ranks social states according to the product of individual utility differences with respect to the origin. This paper examines the axiomatic justification of an aggregation rule in the spirit of the Nash social welfare function, aggregating nonexpected utility individual risk preferences over social states to social ranking of the deterministic social states. The axiomatization of the Nash social welfare function, due to Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) , relies heavily on the expected utility (EU) assumption. Thus the motivation for this paper may be viewed as studying the combined implications of the normative approach suggested by the Nash preference aggregation rule together with the descriptive approach offered by the non-EU literature.
The first aim of this paper is the axiomatic justification of the proposed preference aggregation rule. Apart from assuming the existence of an origin, the crucial axiom in the characterization is a weak version of IIA, in which only relative risk positions with respect to the origin are considered. The second aim is to provide an ordinal interpretation for the aggregation rule. This is achieved by defining the social preference without the use of utility multiplication, but instead by comparing certainty equivalent probabilities. This comparison is undertaken directly when the social states being compared are different for precisely two individuals. When a greater number of individuals show interest in the comparison, it is undertaken indirectly following a sequence of intermediate steps, in which precisely two individuals are involved at each step. A third aim of the paper is the extension of the 'ordinal Nash' bargaining solution that was introduced by Rubinstein et al. (1992) , a reinterpretation of the classic Nash bargaining solution. This solution was defined directly in terms of non-EU risk preferences and physical alternatives and was characterized by an outcome that is immune to all possible appeals. 1 The domain of preference profiles being investigated consists of profiles of preferences having a representation entitled 'origin biseparable' (OB). This is a multiplicatively separable representation for elementary lotteries, i.e. lotteries over two social states, one of which is the origin. These preferences include the EU preferences as a special case, as well as families that accommodate many known violations like the 'Allais paradox' and the 'common ratio effect'. Over the domain of all OB preference profiles we show an impossibility result. This result is then recovered by restricting the domain to the maximal sub-domain which is consistent with the axioms that characterize the social welfare function. Our axiomatic characterization relies on the existence of one comprehensive profile in the domain and some of its permutations. This profile can be viewed as representing preferences over private commodity bundles that exhibit free disposal of individual welfare with no consumption externalities. Other profiles in the domain are not restricted up-front in any way. The analysis utilizes the notion of induced utilities, as introduced in Hanany and Safra (2000) .
The results include conditions on the domain of preference profiles, which ensure that the ordinal Nash social welfare function yields a complete and transitive binary relation over the set of social states. For a society of size two, we define necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize the domain of the function, specifically as a result of the transitivity requirement. These conditions state that the pair of preferences are representable with equal probability distortion functions up to positive power transformations. 2 For a larger society, we define similar necessary and sufficient conditions for the transitivity requirement and sufficient conditions for the completeness property. The latter conditions include smoothness and mild convexity of the utility image of the set of social states.
It is interesting to note the connection of the results in this paper to the general conclusion reached within the social choice literature, discussing the aggregation of individual preferences under subjective EU (SEU) theory. This line of inquiry aims at aggregating both outcome utility functions and subjective probabilities. When SEU axioms are imposed on both social and individual preferences, it is shown that the strict Pareto principle does not generally hold. Mongin (1995) shows within the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) SEU theory that under sufficient conditions of individual preference diversity (when the outcome utility functions are affinely independent), the axioms of SEU and strict Pareto are consistent only when all individual subjective probability beliefs are identical. This result and other similar work may be compared with our conclusion that the preference aggregation requirements are consistent only when all individual preferences are compatible with the same objective probability distortion function, up to positive power transformations, over the set of elementary lotteries.
The paper is also related to the social choice literature on cardinal utilities. Our analysis emphasizes the role of the origin in the preference aggregation rule, as opposed to its other two main properties. The first property is the individual cardinal utility assumption, meaning that individual utilities represent preferences uniquely up to a positive affine transformation. The second property is the non-comparability of cardinal utilities, which means that social preference is equal for cardinally equivalent individual utility profiles. Defining cardinally equivalent profiles such that the affine transformations are not necessarily interdependent across individuals, such a property is referred to as an 1 A bargaining model stems from an entirely different motivation than that which guides social choice. Apart from this crucial distinction between this paper and RST's, the main additional difference is the requirement in this paper that a social welfare function aggregates preferences to a complete and transitive ordering of all social states, whereas a bargaining solution in general only picks (at least) one of these social states as a bargaining outcome. Thus a bargaining solution may not be rationalized by a social welfare function, i.e. there may not exist a preference relation over all social states, the maximization of which always yields bargaining outcomes.
2 In Hanany (2005) we derive the same conditions when axiomatizing a two-player bargaining solution similar to the ordinal Nash, in a framework where the agreements reached by players in different bargaining situations are considered as a way to reveal the bargainers' (not necessarily transitive) preferences as a group. assumption of no interpersonal comparability of cardinal individual welfare. Sen (1970) showed that without the origin assumption there is an impossibility result for cardinality and non-comparability. This impossibility result is analogue to Arrow's impossibility, which results from ordinality and non-comparability. It was pointed out by Sen that an escape route from cardinality with non-comparability could be found within a framework similar to Nash (1950) bargaining theory, through the restriction of the domain to profiles with an origin. 3 This method of achieving a possibility result shows the extent to which the origin assumption is crucial for the aggregation rule investigated in this paper. One can easily check that non-comparability of cardinal utility holds for the Nash social welfare function. This is the case since applying any affine transformations to the individual utility functions does not change the social preference. It would appear that the possibility result draws not on cardinal but "ordinal comparability" that utilizes the origin. Moreover, it is a modest type of ordinal comparability, since it doesn't imply egalitarianism as does full ordinal comparability (d'Aspremont and Gevers, 1977) . A natural question arises regarding the implications of assuming this kind of ordinal origin comparability without the cardinality assumption. The answer to this question can be found in this paper, as it confronts the necessity of the acceptable interpretation of cardinal utilities as vNM utilities that represent EU risk preferences.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the axioms, Section 3 characterizes the social welfare function for the case of two individuals, Section 4 specifies the conditions for a general, finite size of society and Section 5 develops an axiomatization of the function over the domains being investigated.
Axioms and social welfare function
Consider a finite society of individuals, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. The society is associated with a fixed, nonempty and compact (in some topological space) set X of possible social states and a social state x 0 (origin). State x 0 is considered the worst for all individuals in the society. Each member k of the society has a preference relation ∼ k (complete and transitive binary relation) over the set of simple (finite) lotteries over X ∪ x 0 . A lottery of the form px + (1 − p)x 0 , where p is the probability of x ∈ X and 1 − p is the probability of x 0 , is called an elementary lottery and is denoted px. Abusing notation, a degenerate lottery with prize x is denoted by x. As usual, ∼ k and k denote the symmetric and asymmetric components of ∼ k , respectively. A profile of preferences ∼ k n k=1 is denoted by ∼ . Consider a preference relation ∼ k for which there exists an onto and strictly increasing function g k : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and a function v k : X → R normalized with v k (x 0 ) = 0, such that for every pair px, qy of elementary lotteries,
. This representation is not necessarily applicable for general lotteries, thus we call it an 'origin biseparable' (OB) representation. Let P be the set of all such preference relations. The set P contains (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2001 ) biseparable preferences, when the latter is restricted to preferences over lotteries. This in turn includes the entire family of 'rank-dependent utility' (RDU) preferences (Quiggin, 1982; Weymark, 1981) and 'disappointment aversion' (DA) family (Gul, 1991) . The set P also contains the family of 'disagreement linear' (DL) preferences introduced by Grant and Kajii (1995) (when disagreement is replaced by x 0 ), for which g k (p) = p, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. DL preferences contain EU preferences.
We consider social welfare functions W : D → B, where D ⊆ P n and B is the set of all binary relations R over X. Thus unlike Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) , we are not concerned with social risk preferences, but instead use individual risk preferences as an information basis for social choice. This modelling is justified by viewing only elements of X as possible social outcomes. A further justification relates to the departure from EU preferences. Aggregation of non-EU preferences to possibly non-EU social preferences over lotteries on X leads to strong restrictions on the domain D. This conflicts with our aim to characterize the widest possible domain consistent with the axioms. The symmetric and asymmetric components of a social binary relation R are denoted by I and P, respectively.
3 A different way to resolve the individual cardinal utilities impossibility, that was discussed extensively in the social choice literature, is to weaken the non-comparability assumption to unit comparability or full comparability. These assumptions strengthen the cardinally equivalent utility profiles requirement by imposing a connection between the positive affine transformations of individual utilities. Unit comparability is achieved when all these transformations have the same positive multiplier and full comparability results when it is further required that all possess the same added constant. Adding an anonymity axiom, these weaker assumptions were shown to characterize the utilitarian (d'Aspremont and Gevers, 1977) and leximin (Deschamps and Gevers, 1978) aggregation rules.
For each profile in the domain D, we assume for simplicity of presentation that (1) for every x ∈ X, x x 0 , 4 (2) there exists y ∈ X such that y x 0 , and (3) for some origin biseparable representations g k v k , the set { v k (x) n k=1 ∈ R n |x ∈ X} is compact. 5 We also assume that the domain contains one x 0 -comprehensive profile and some of this profile's permutations. A profile ∼ is x 0 -comprehensive if for any i ∈ N, x ∈ X and p ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique state y ∈ X such that y∼ i px and y∼ k x for k = i. Such profiles can be viewed as exhibiting free disposal of individual welfare, where X may be viewed as a set of perfectly divisible private commodity bundles, with no consumption externalities. In particular this implies that X must be sufficiently rich, e.g. a real convex set. Another example in which x 0 -comprehensive profiles exist is when X is the set of lotteries over allocations of an indivisible good, including not allocating it to any member of the society, where the latter is equivalent to x 0 for each i. Denote by D CM the set of all x 0 -comprehensive profiles in P n . We therefore state the following domain restriction, which allows the consideration of sub-domains that include one x 0 -comprehensive profile and its two-individual permutations. Other profiles in the domain are not restricted up-front in any way. Denote by π a permutation of the individuals (1, . . . , n). ∈ D.
The social preference characterized by our axioms takes into account the relative position of states with respect to the origin x 0 . The relative position is defined by the probability, according to which a mixture of one state with x 0 is equivalent to a second state. Consider a society consisting of two individuals. Suppose for the pair of states x, y ∈ X, that px∼ 1 y, qy∼ 2 x and p ≤ q. In this case, we understand that individual 1 prefers state x over state y and individual 2 has opposing preferences. However, in terms of the certainty equivalent probabilities p and q, state x is located in a higher position for 2 than y is for 1. This may be interpreted as saying that individual 1 exhibits welfare improvement when moving from state y to state x, improvement that is higher than the welfare improvement that individual 2 exhibits when moving from state x to state y. Thus we could argue that society should prefer the state x over the state y. In the case of Pareto dominance, where such a comparison is not possible, the preference is defined to agree with the Pareto rule, i.e. the dominating state is preferred.
We refer to the social preference defined in this way as the 'ordinal Nash' social preference. Our results show the equivalence of this definition to the Nash social preference (Kaneko and Nakamura, 1979) . The choice of name for the social preference is also justified by its connection to the 'ordinal Nash' bargaining solution of Rubinstein et al. (1992) , in particular to their definition of an 'appeal' in bargaining. The function that assigns, to every preference profile of the society, the corresponding ordinal Nash social preference is called the 'ordinal Nash social welfare function'. The definition of the function for society of an arbitrary, finite size is postponed to Section 4. Definition 2. The ordinal Nash social welfare function, denoted ON, assigns for a preference profile ∼ ∈ P 2 , a binary relation R ∈ B such that for any x, y ∈ X, xRy if either x y, or there exist i, j ∈ N and p, q ∈ [0, 1] such that px∼ i y, qy∼ j x and p ≤ q.
We now state the axioms imposed on a social welfare function W. The first and second axioms are the standard weak order assumption and strict Pareto optimality condition. . For x, y ∈ X, if x y and x j y for some j, then xPy. 4 We use the following notation: x ∼ y ⇔ x k y, ∀k ∈ N and x y ⇔ x k y, ∀k ∈ N. The notation ≥ and > is used for corresponding comparisons of vectors in R n + . 5 An equivalent statement of this property may be written by replacing the quantifier 'for some' by 'for all'. This holds because any origin
The third axiom is the standard anonymity condition, in which the social preference is independent of the individuals' name or order. Thus permuting individual preferences should not change the social preference.
Definition 5. ANM (anonymity): Let π be any permutation of the individuals (1, . . . , n) 
). For any x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if xR π y.
The fourth axiom is a weak version of IIA combined with neutrality. It requires that preference profiles of identical structure with respect to corresponding pairs of social states, ought to lead to identical social preference between these pairs. This is an adaptation to non-EU preferences of an axiom used by Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) . Below we discuss how under an extra domain restriction, this axiom can be broken down to two separate axioms, i.e. IIA and neutrality. Note that only preferences over elementary lotteries are considered in the profiles associated in the axiom.
Definition 6. IIA-NEU (independence of irrelevant alternatives with neutral property): Let
. Let x, y,x,ỹ ∈ X such that for each k and any p ∈ [0, 1], x∼ k py ⇔x∼ k pỹ and px∼ k y ⇔ px∼ kỹ . Then xRy if and only ifxR ỹ.
The axiom IIA-NEU is crucial to the characterization of the social welfare function, since it is the only axiom that involves the origin. The axiom involves the probability for which one social state is the certainty equivalent of an elementary lottery involving a better social state. This certainty equivalent probability is viewed as a measure for the position of one social state on the scale from the origin to the better state. The axiom says that this kind of measure should matter for the social preference. In other words, if in one profile states x and y are related by the same certainty equivalent probability as do statesx andỹ in another profile, then the social ranking for the first profile between x and y should be the same as the social ranking for the second profile betweenx andỹ. 6 The axiom implies non-comparability for cardinal utilities, since for EU preferences the social ranking will depend on utility representations up to independently chosen positive affine transformations. Instead, this axiom suggests a kind of ordinal origin comparability. Finally, the axiom involves a neutrality property, since it relates different pairs of states in different profiles. In all of the results in the paper, under an additional domain restriction the axiom IIA-NEU can be broken down to the following two separate axioms. The first, IIA, is the same as IIA-NEU, except that only one pair of states is considered. The second axiom, NEU, says that the social preference is independent of the actual identity of social states. Definition 8. NEU (neutrality): Let ∼ , ∼ ∈ D for which there exists a bijection ψ : X → X such that for every
and R = W( ∼ ) . Then xRy if and only if ψ(x)R ψ(y).
This separation of IIA-NEU to two axioms is possible under the following domain restriction CN, which assumes a sufficiently rich domain. In order to simplify the presentation, our results (except for the proof of Proposition 1 below) are stated using the combined axiom IIA-NEU and without the extra domain restriction CN.
Definition 9. CN (closure under neutrality): W is defined over a non-empty domain D ⊆ P n such that for any ∼ ∈ D and any bijection ψ : X → X, there exists ∼ ∈ D such that for all k ∈ N and p, q ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ X, px ∼ k qy ⇔ pψ(x) ∼ k qψ(y).
The first implication of our axioms is a result showing the particular utility information relevant for the social ranking. Since we are not necessarily in the EU framework, the relevant information is a utility definition that generalizes vNM utility to non-EU preferences and relies on the origin. This approach requires the notion of induced utilities, as was first introduced in Hanany and Safra (2000) , referring to the Nash bargaining solution. Given k ∈ N and a preference ∼ k ∈ P, consider functions u k : X × {x ∈ X|x k x 0 } → R + that are increasing with respect to ∼ k in their first argument, decreasing in the second, and satisfy u k (x; x) = 1, x∼ k x 0 ⇒ u k (x; y) = 0 and u k (x; y)u k (y; x) = 1. The set of all such functions for any ∼ k ∈ P is denoted by U.
Definition 10. The induced utility mapping is the function IU : P → U, that is defined by
The function u k = IU ∼ k is the induced utility of ∼ k . It is well defined since the function g k in the origin biseparable representation g k v k of ∼ k ∈ P is strictly increasing. Moreover,
For an EU preference with utility function
, where u k are the induced utility functions of ∼ k . For any W satisfying IIA-NEU on D ⊆ P n , define the set A W , characterizing W in terms of induced utility vectors, as follows.
Proof. Let ∼ ∈ D and R = W( ∼ ). Let x, y ∈ X such that y x 0 . If u(x; y) ∈ A W , then there exist ∼ ∈ D with associated induced utility vector u andx,ỹ ∈ X, such that u (x;ỹ) = u(x; y), R = W( ∼ ) andxR ỹ. Thus xRy by IIA-NEU. The other direction is immediate from the definition of A W .
When IIA-NEU is replaced by the separate axioms IIA and NEU under the domain restriction CN, the proof involves an additional step after establishingxR ỹ. Let the bijection in the definition of CN, ψ : X → X, satisfy ψ(x) = x and ψ(ỹ) = y. Let ∼ ∈ D such that for every k ∈ N, p, q ∈ [0, 1] and w, z ∈ X, pw ∼ k qz ⇔ pψ(w) ∼ k qψ(z). Let R = W( ∼ ). Then xR y by NEU. Applying IIA with ∼ and ∼ , it follows that xRy.
Society of size two
In this section we axiomatically characterize the social welfare function when only two individuals make up the society. We start by the following proposition, which characterizes the social preference using the set A W that appears in Proposition 1. 7 Then we present an impossibility result, showing that the axioms are inconsistent over the domain P 2 . The impossibility is then recovered to a possibility result by restricting the domain.
Proposition 2. Let n = 2. Let W satisfy WO, PAR, ANM and IIA-NEU under the domain restriction CMP.
(
For any x, y ∈ X, xRy if, and only if, y x 0 implies u 1 (x; y)u 2 (x; y) ≥ 1. Furthermore, not x x 0 and xRy imply not y x 0 .
Proof. In order to prove (1), we first show that A W = {s ∈ R 2 + |s 1 s 2 ≥ 1}. Let s, t ∈ R n + such that s < t. For s > 0, denote (1/s 1 , 1/s 2 ) by s −1 . Denote s = (s 2 , s 1 ) .
. By monotonicity of u and since ∼ ∈ D CM , there exist x, y, z ∈ X such that x < z, y x 0 , s = u(x; y) and t = u(z; y). Therefore s = u (x; y), where u is the induced utility vector of ∼ 2 , ∼ 1 . Moreover, s > 0 implies x x 0 and z x 0 . Thus s > 0 implies s −1 = u(y; x) and t −1 = u(y; z). By ANM, xRy if, and only if, xR y. Using Proposition 1, the following three properties hold. (1) (2) Proposition 2 provides one direction of our axiomatic characterization. The rest of the section is devoted to the other direction, dealing with consistency of the axioms. In particular, the only issue is whether the social binary relation defined by ON is complete and transitive. Therefore, Corollary 1 is meaningful. Let D C ⊆ P 2 be the set of all ∼ for which R = ON( ∼ ) is a complete binary relation.
Corollary 1.
Proof.
(1) According to the induced utilities definition, for any x 0 < x, y ∈ X and k ∈ N, u k (x; y)u k (y; x) = 1. Thus either k u k (x; y) ≥ 1, or k u k (y; x) ≥ 1. Therefore R is complete by Proposition 2. 
The corollary demonstrates a domain, over which the social welfare function ON satisfies WO. Unfortunately, there exist examples of preference profiles in P 2 , for which the social binary relation is not transitive. This conclusion is stated below in Proposition 3 as an impossibility result.
Proposition 3. There exists no social welfare function W satisfying WO, PAR, ANM and IIA-NEU over the domain
Proof. By Proposition 2, W = ON. The impossibility is proved using a preference profile in P 2 , for which ON produces a non-transitive social binary relation. Such a profile is demonstrated in the following example. Example 1. Let X = {x ∈ R 2 + | k x k ≤ 9} and x 0 = (0, 0) Let ∼ ∈ P 2 , where ∼ 1 is an EU preference with a vNM utility function v 1 (x) = x 1 and ∼ 2 is a Disappointment Averse (DA) preference, for which v 2 (x) = x 2 , g 2 (p) = p/1 + (1 − p)β 2 and β 2 = 1. The corresponding induced utility functions satisfy u 1 (x; y) = x 1 /y 1 and u 2 (x; y) = 2/(1 + y 2 /x 2 ) for y ∼ 2 x. Let x, y, z ∈ X, where x = (6, 1), y = (3, 3) and z = (2, 6). Then k u k (x; y) = 6(/3)2/(1 + 3/1) = 1, k u k (y; z) = (3/2)2/(1 + 6/3) = 1 and k u k (x; z) = (6/2)2/(1 + 6/1) < 1. Therefore, by Proposition 2, xIyIz, but zPx.
Example 1 motivates the investigation of domains, over which ON produces a transitive social binary relation. In the example, the individuals have different probability distortion functions, one of them fits the EU assumption, while the other does not. It turns out that this fact is crucial to transitivity, as can be seen by Proposition 4. The result proves a necessary and sufficient condition for transitivity, defined as follows.
Definition 11. UD (uniform distortion): A pair of preferences ∼ ∈ P 2 satisfies UD if there exists a bijection φ : X → X such that for every p, q ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ X,
The set of all preference pairs satisfying UD is denoted by D UD .
Proposition 4. Let ∼ ∈ D CM and R = ON( ∼ ). The followings are equivalent:
(1) R is transitive
Proof. Let g k v k be an origin biseparable representation of ∼ k . First we show that (2) implies (4). Suppose that
. Then ∼ 1 can be represented for any elementary lottery px by g 2 (p)ṽ 1 (x). This is exactly (4). Now we show that (4) implies (1). Suppose that g 1 = g 2 = g. Let x, y, z ∈ X such that xRyRz. If x z, or not x x 0 , or not y x 0 , or not z x 0 , then xRz by Proposition 2. Otherwise, by Proposition 2, either u k (x; y) ≥ 1 for both k ∈ N, or there exist i ∈ N such that
. Thus xRz by Proposition 2. Hence R is transitive.
Next we show that (1) implies (3). Let f 2 :
, β 2 = f 2 (β 1 ) and x 0 < w ∈ X. By monotonicity of both v i and since ∼ ∈ D CM , there exist x, y, z ∈ X such that x∼ 2 w, v 1 (x) = α 2 β 2 v 1 (w), v 1 (y) = α 2 v 1 (w), v 2 (y) = β 1 v 2 (w), z∼ 1 w and v 2 (z) = α 1 β 1 v 2 (w). Therefore u 2 (z; y) =g 
Note that in Proposition 4, D ⊆ D CM is needed only for (2), (3) and (4) to be implied by (1). The equivalence of properties (2)-(4) and each implying (1) hold also under the weaker domain restriction CMP. Roughly speaking, the "closer" is a profile ∼ to D CM , the "closer" it is also to D UD as a result of transitivity implications. Proposition 4 shows that EU is not necessary to derive transitivity of the ON social binary relation. We can have profiles of non-EU preferences, as long as all preferences violate the EU assumption in a similar way. Note that the result permits the characterization of transitivity through a condition that depends only on the distortion functions g k , not on the functions v k . This separation is permissible due to the origin biseparable property of the preferences in P.
Following are examples of subsets of D UD formed by intersection with known families of preferences.
Example 2.
(1) DL preferences. The set D UD contains all DL preference (Grant and Kajii (1995) ) profiles, including all EU preference profiles. DL preferences can be represented with g(p) = p, ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
(2) RDU preferences. The set D UD contains all profiles of RDU preferences, for which the distortion functions are g δ k for some g and δ k > 0, ∀k ∈ N. In other words, the individual distortion functions are the same up to a positive power transformation. This allows for a very wide range of risk attitudes, as characterized by both the power parameter δ k and by the entirely unrestricted curvature of the functions v k . For example, since g may not be the identity function, this allows behavior which is consistent with the 'Allais paradox' and the 'common ratio effect'. This behavior is excluded by EU or DL preferences. Note that taking a positive power transformation of both g and v k preserves the property UD, but does not preserve a RDU representation for general lotteries. This demonstrates that the kind of restriction implemented by UD is in a sense weak, since only preferences over elementary lotteries are involved. In other words, the requirement that all individuals have identical RDU distortion functions for general lotteries is much more restrictive than the property UD. 8 (3) DA preferences. The set D UD contains all profiles of DA preferences, for which
In other words, the individual disappointment aversion parameters β k are equal in these profiles (see Example 1 for the case of non-transitivity under which this condition is violated).
Proposition 4 states that the ON social binary relation is transitive only for all the profiles in the set D UD . This seems to be a disappointing result, since it limits the applicability of the preference aggregation rule implied by the axioms. But it also has an interesting positive implication concerning the role of the EU assumption in the derivation of the Nash social welfare function. It turns out that the axioms that imply the preference aggregation rule are consistent in the case of EU preferences only because these preferences have a common feature with respect to risk attitude. The important issue is the initial similarity in risk attitudes (equality of distortion functions up to positive power transformations). Whether it is EU or some other assumption on risk attitude, the crucial factor is that all individuals agree on it. The results show that the social welfare function applies to a rich setting, within which EU or DL preferences constitute an extremely small subset. This conclusion suggests that the EU assumption is too restrictive in the analysis of the connection between individual and social choice.
We are now able to provide the main characterization theorem of this section. The theorem states that the function ON is characterized uniquely by the axioms on D UD , where it satisfies WO and moreover has a Nash-like utility product representation.
Theorem 1. Let n = 2 and consider a domain D satisfying the domain restrictions CMP and D
( 
Proof. The part of (1) 
It is left to prove consistency of the axioms by showing that ON satisfies them. Completeness and transitivity follow from Corollary 1 and Proposition 4 (the proof does not rely on being a member of D CM ). If x y and x j y for some j, then k v k (x) > k v k (y). Therefore xPy. Hence PAR is satisfied. Axiom ANM is satisfied, since for any permutation π of the players and any x ∈ X, k v π k (x) = k v k (x). Now we check axiom IIA-NEU. xRy x 0 implies k u k (x; y) ≥ 1 by Proposition 2. u k (x; y) = u k (x;ỹ) for each k ∈ N implies k u k (x;ỹ) ≥ 1. ThereforexR ỹ. If not y x 0 , then notỹ x 0 . ThusxR ỹ. Hence IIA-NEU is satisfied.
Utilizing the ON social welfare function, in the case of EU preferences, Theorem 1 provides an interpretation of Nash's utility product maximization principle for social choice. The theorem also extends this interpretation by considering non-EU preference profiles in P. Furthermore, this extension yields the largest subset of D CM for which the interpretation is valid, i.e. for which the ON social welfare function satisfies WO. For this extended domain, when choosing appropriately the functions v k to have identical distortion functions g k , the information provided by v k is sufficient to derive the social preference. This conclusion holds despite the fact that v k generally convey only partial information about the preferences in P.
To conclude this section, the next proposition shows that the axioms are independent under the domain restrictions of Theorem 1. Proof. The proof establishes independence by providing, for each axiom, a social welfare function that violates this axiom but satisfies the other axioms. 
for both i, the conditions of IIA-NEU are satisfied. However, v 1 (x) + v 2 (x) = v 1 (ỹ) + v 2 (ỹ). Thus xIy, but not xIỹ, violating the axiom.
Society of size greater than two
In the general case, where the society has more than two individuals, the ON interpretation can be extended to allow comparisons between social states that are different for more than two individuals. Such a comparison is not as clear as in the case of n = 2. For example, in the case where n = 3, a social state may be preferable for one individual but worse for the other two, thus a direct comparison as in the case where n = 2 is not possible. In this scenario, the use of the majority rule for example, would not express the comparison in welfare improvement as considered in the former definition. In order to incorporate such comparisons, we extend the social preference definition by utilizing its transitivity property when a direct comparison is not possible. This extension is shown to be implied by the axioms in the main characterization Theorem 2 of the next section.
Definition 12. Given a profile ∼ ∈ P n , for any l = 1, 2, . . ., define the binary relations R l ∈ B such that for any x, y ∈ X, (1) xR 1 y if there exist i, j ∈ N such that x∼ k y for each k ∈ N \ {i, j} and either x ∼ k y for k ∈ {i, j}, or there exist p, q ∈ [0, 1] such that px∼ i y, qy∼ j x and p ≤ q. (2) For any l ≥ 2, xR l y if there exist z ∈ X such that xR l−1 zR 1 y.
Definition 13. The ordinal Nash social welfare function, denoted ON, assigns for a preference profile ∼ ∈ P n , a binary relation R ∈ B such that for any x, y ∈ X, xRy if (1) xR 1 y or, (2) xR l y for l > 1 and #{k ∈ N|x k = y k } > 2.
This definition, despite being long, is a straightforward generalization of the one for n = 2. The latter is provided by R 1 , except that all individuals other than the two which are involved in the direct comparison must be indifferent between the states being compared. For R l where l ≥ 2, we get a preference that takes into account higher transitivity implications of R 1 . Definition 13 is related to the extension of the ordinal Nash bargaining outcome to n > 2, which was proposed without axiomatic characterization by Burgos et al. (2002a, b) 9 . When n > 2 and the social states being compared matter for more than two individuals, the preference is determined indirectly through a sequence of comparisons as in the n = 2 scenario. An illustration of an indirect comparison is presented in the following example.
Example 3. Let n = 3, X = {x ∈ R n + | k x k ≤ 9} and x 0 = (0, 0, 0). Let ∼ ∈ P n , where ∼ k are DL preferences, (3, 3, 3) and y = (1, 4, 4). Then xR 1 y does not hold since x, y are different for all k ∈ N. Nevertheless, z = (2, 4, 3) ∈ X satisfies xP 1 z, since x, z matter only for individuals 1 and 2, 2/3x∼ 1 z, 3/4z∼ 2 x and 2/3 < 3/4. Similarly, zP 1 y, since z, y matter only for individuals 1 and 3, 1/2z∼ 1 y, 3/4y∼ 3 z and 1/2 < 3/4. Thus, xR 2 y and therefore xRy. Note that in order to deduce xPy, we must show that yR l x does not hold for any l ≥ 2.
Although the ON social preference definition is extended based on a sequence of comparisons, thus ensuring transitivity when a direct comparison is not possible, transitivity does not necessarily hold in general. The example of non-transitivity given in Section 3 is also relevant here if we assume that all individuals except two are indifferent between the states in the example. Furthermore, in contrast to the case where n = 2, the extended social binary relation is not necessarily complete, since the existence of a sequence which permits indirect comparison is not guaranteed for all pairs of social states. Hence, we are interested in domains over which ON satisfies the axioms and in particular WO. As before, the induced utilities are useful in this analysis. The following proposition is an analogue of Proposition 4. It extends the necessary and sufficient conditions for the ON social binary relation to be transitive (proof in the appendix). The definition of D UD extends to n > 2 in a straightforward way by requiring, for every k > 1, the existence of φ k satisfying px ∼ 1 qy ⇔ pφ k (x) ∼ k qφ k (y) for any p, q ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ X. Proposition 6. Let ∼ ∈ D CM and R = ON( ∼ ). The followings are equivalent:
Proposition 7 and its interpretations are analogous to part (2) of Theorem 1. The proposition states conditions under which the function ON satisfies WO and has a Nash-like utility product representation (proof in the appendix). As before, let D C ⊆ P n be the set of all ∼ for which R = ON( ∼ ) is a complete binary relation (the analysis of the set D C appears at the end of this section). 
The axioms PAR and ANM do not impose any further constraints on the domain investigated. Unlike the case of n = 2, a different conclusion holds for the axiom IIA-NEU, since there exist domains for which the ON social welfare function does not satisfy this axiom. Proposition 8 considers domains as of Propositions 6 and 7, and presents necessary and sufficient conditions under which the axiom IIA-NEU is satisfied (see Fig. 1 ). Note that we are still not confined to the EU case. Definition 14. Given k ∈ N and ∼ k ∈ P, D UD ( ∼ k ) is the set of all preference profiles ∼ ∈ P n such that for each i ∈ N there exists a bijection φ i : X → X such that for every p, q ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ X,
Proof. Let ∼ , ∼ ∈ D and let gv k , g v k be the respective origin biseparable representations. Let R = ON( ∼ ), R = ON( ∼ ) and let u k , u k be the induced utility functions of ∼ k , ∼ k , respectively.
To prove the 'if' direction, suppose without loss of generality that D ⊆ D UD ( ∼ 1 ). For ∼ , let φ 1 be the bijection that
, ∼ 1 can be represented for any elementary lottery px by g (p)ṽ 1 (x). Thus without loss of generality we can assume g = g . Verifying IIA, suppose u k (x; y) = u k (x;ỹ) for every k ∈ N. To prove the 'only if' direction, suppose ON satisfies IIA-NEU on
Let α, β ∈ [0, 1], i, j, l ∈ N and x 0 < w,w ∈ X such that w∼ kw for k ∈ N \ {i, j, l}. Then by monotonicity of v k and since ∼ , ∼ ∈ D CM , there exist x, y,x,ỹ ∈ X such that x∼ k w for k ∈ N \ {i, j},
. Therefore xIy by Proposition 7. Furthermore, for every k ∈ N, u k (x;ỹ) = u k (x; y). ThusxI ỹ by IIA-NEU. Therefore k v k (x) = k v k (ỹ). Thus we have Cauchy's power functional equation ∀α, β ∈ [0, 1], f (αβ) = f (α)f (β). The unique solution f, that is continuous and strictly increasing, satisfies for some δ > 0 and ∀α 
Note that in Proposition 8, D ⊆ D CM is needed only for the 'only if' direction. The 'if' direction holds also under the weaker domain restriction CMP and D ⊆ D C ∩ D UD . Similarly to Proposition 4, roughly speaking, the "closer" are two profiles ∼ , ∼ to D CM , the "closer" they are also to D UD ( ∼ k ) for some ∼ k in these profiles, as a result of implications of IIA-NEU.
In order to ensure completeness, it is possible to add a smoothness and convexity assumption as sufficient conditions. The extra assumption may be applied only to the utility image of the set X and not to the distortion functions g k . The convexity condition we suggest is not very strong since it merely applies to the set of log-utilities of the social states in X.
Definition 15. SSLC (Smoothness and Strict Log-Convexity): A preference profile ∼ ∈ P n satisfies SSLC if there exist origin biseparable representations g k v k such that { log v k (x) n k=1 ∈ R n |x 0 < x ∈ X} has a smooth boundary and is strictly convex. 10 Let D SSLC ⊆ P n be the set of all profiles ∼ that satisfy SSLC. 11 The property SSLC implies geometric conditions which are sufficient for the completeness of the social binary relation. These conditions are presented in Lemma A.2 and are used in the following Proposition 9 (the lemma is presented in the appendix). Proposition 9 is analogous to Corollary 1. The difference between the two is the addition of the SSLC condition here to ensure completeness of the social binary relation in the case where n > 2.
e. the function ON yields a complete binary relation on
By completeness of the relation ≥ on the set { k v k (x) ∈ R + |x ∈ X}, it suffices to show that for any x, y ∈ X, 
Thus xRŷRy by Lemma A.1. Therefore xRy by transitivity of R.
Example 4. Considering again Example 3. The conditions of Proposition 9 hold. We can conclude that x = (3, 3, 3)Py = (1, 4, 4) since the utility product 27 is strictly larger than the utility product 16. Furthermore, x is the unique optimal social state in X, since it is the only state that maximizes the individual utility product gain over the social state x 0 .
10 A set A ⊆ R n is strictly convex if for any a, b ∈ A and λ ∈ (0, 1), λa + (1 − λ)b is an interior point of A. 11 Note that in order to check whether a preference profile satisfies the property SSLC, any origin biseparable representations g k v k may be chosen for preferences in that profile. This is true because any origin biseparable representation of ∼ k is of the form (g k ) α k (v k ) α k , for some α k > 0. Thus, checking whether the set { log [v k (x)] α k n k=1 ∈ R n |x 0 < x ∈ X} is strictly convex does not depend on the value of α k chosen.
Characterization of the ordinal Nash social welfare function
We now provide a characterization of the ON social welfare function over the domains investigated in previous sections. In the case where n = 2, the axiomatization is carried out for the set D UD , as stated in Theorem 1. In the case where n > 2, the axiomatization is restricted to domains contained in D C ∩ D UD ( ∼ k ) for some k ∈ N and ∼ k ∈ P, as required by Propositions 6, 7 and 8. A full characterization of the set A W as defined in Proposition 1 appears in the appendix. Proof. The case of n = 2 is shown by Theorem 1. We provide a proof for the case of n > 2. Let A W be the set defined in Proposition 1 and let s ∈ R n + . Suppose first that there exist i, j ∈ N for which s k = 1 for each k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Then s ∈ A W if, and only if, s i s j ≥ 1. Furthermore, for any ∼ ∈ D, R = W( ∼ ) and x, y ∈ X such that there exist i, j ∈ N for which x∼ k y for each k ∈ N \ {i, j}, xRy if, and only if, y x 0 implies u i (x; y)u j (x; y)≥ 1. The proof is similar to the one given for Proposition 2 applied for individuals i, j instead of 1, 2, two profiles for which only i, j are permuted, vectors t,s for which all components except i, j equal to 1 and states x, y, z for which x∼ k y∼ k z for each k ∈ N \ {i, j}. x 0 implies u iˆl (zˆl −1 ; zˆl)u jˆl (zˆl −1 ; zˆl) > 1. Therefore zˆl −1 Pzˆl. Thus yPx by transitivity. By completeness of R , for any ∼ ∈ D, R = W( ∼ ) and x, y ∈ X, xRy if, and only if, xR y. Hence, W( ∼ ) = ON( ∼ ), proving one direction of (1). Thus (4) follows from Proposition 7. Part (3) of the theorem, as well as ON satisfying the axioms, follow from Propositions 6, 8 and 9 and the claims given for PAR and ANM in the proof of Theorem 1. Since (1,1) is not a scalar multiple of (t i 2 , t j 2 ), the setD 2 = {r ∈C 2 \ {(ã i 2 ,ã j 2 )}|(r 1 −ã i 2 ) + (r 2 −ã j 2 ) ≥ 0} is not empty. Moreover, there exist ε > 0 andd ≡ (ã i 2 + ε,ã j 2 − ε) ∈D 2 , such thatd is an interior point ofC 2 (see Fig. 3 . The sequences i l , j l , c l can then be extended as in case (4) to satisfy the required conditions. (6) Assume now that b is on the boundary ∂C of C and a is an interior point of C. Similarly to case (5), there existsĉ, an interior point of C, and i, j ∈ N such thatb k = b k for each k ∈ N \ {i, j} andb ibj = b i b j . Thus the sequences i l , j l , c l will satisfy the required conditions when extended as in case (4) for a andb.
